Abstract Among the many sorts of problems encountered in decision theory, allocation problems occupy a central position. Such problems call for the assignment of a nonnegative real number to each member of a finite (more generally, countable) set of entities, in such a way that the values so assigned sum to some fixed positive real number .
enterprises. In determining an
s -allocation it is common to solicit the opinions of more than one individual, which leads immediately to the question of how to aggregate their typically differing allocations into a single "consensual" allocation. Guided by the traditions of social choice theory (in which the aggregation of preferential orderings, or of utilities is at issue) decision theorists have taken an axiomatic approach to determining acceptable methods of allocation aggregation. In such approaches so-called "independence" conditions have been ubiquitous. Such conditions dictate that the consensual allocation assigned to each entity should depend only on the allocations assigned by individuals to that entity, taking no account of the allocations that they assign to any other entities. While there are reasons beyond mere simplicity for subjecting allocation aggregation to independence, this radically anti-holistic stricture has frequently proved to severely limit the set of acceptable aggregation methods. As we show in what follows, the limitations are particularly acute in the case of three or more entities which must be assigned nonnegative values summing to some fixed positive number .
s For if the set [0, ] Vs  of values that may be assigned to these entities satisfies some simple closure conditions and (as is always the case in practice) V is finite, then independence allows only for dictatorial or imposed (i.e., constant) aggregation. This theorem builds on and extends a theorem of Bradley and Wagner [6] and, when {0,1} V  , yields as a corollary an impossibility theorem of Dietrich [8] on judgment aggregation.
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Allocation Aggregation and Independence.
Among the many sorts of problems encountered in decision theory, allocation problems occupy a central position. Such problems call for the assignment of a nonnegative real number to each member of a finite (or more generally, countable) set of entities, in such a way that the values so assigned sum to some fixed positive real number . s When the entities in question constitute a set of pairwise mutually exclusive, exhaustive states of the world, and 1, s  such an allocation is called a probability mass function. 1 When s designates a certain sum of money, or other material resource, and the entities in question are various enterprises, such an allocation distributes (all of) the resource in question among those enterprises. The terms of an allocation problem may dictate certain restrictions on the allocated amounts, or allow them to be totally unrestricted, except for the constraint on their sum.
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In determining an s -allocation, it is common to solicit the opinions of more than one individual, which leads immediately to the question of how to aggregate their typically differing allocations into a single "consensual" allocation. In this matter, decision theorists have followed the lead of social welfare theorists such as Kenneth Arrow [3] in approaching the problem axiomatically. In axiomatic approaches to allocation aggregation, so-called independence 3 conditions have been ubiquitous. Such conditions dictate that the "consensual" allocation value assigned to a given entity should depend only on the values assigned by individuals to that entity, taking no account of the values that they assign to any other entities. It should be noted, however, that the adoption of such a radically anti-holistic stricture on the synthesis of expert opinion has been motivated by reasons beyond mere simplicity. McConway [13] has shown, for example, that an aggregation method for probability measures commutes with marginalization to sub-sigma algebras precisely when the "consensual" probability assigned to each event E depends only on E and the probabilities assigned to E by the experts in question. In the case of judgment aggregation, where individuals are limited to assigning propositions one of the values true or false, Dietrich [8] has shown that independence conditions of varying strength correlate with immunity of an aggregation method to various types of agenda manipulation. On a different note, Wagner ([17] , [18] ) has argued that independence conditions (or variations thereof allowing for normalization after entity-by-entity aggregation) are a predictable concomitant of universal domain conditions, which require of an aggregation method that it be applicable to every logically possible "profile" of individual opinions.
On the other hand, subjecting allocation aggregation to an independence requirement has frequently proved to severely limit the set of acceptable aggregation methods.
In what follows we demonstrate that independence places particularly acute restrictions on the aggregation of s -allocations to three or more entities when the valuation domain (viz., the subset of values in [0, ] s that may be assigned to these entities) is finite and satisfies some simple closure conditions. For subjecting the aggregation of such s -allocations to independence (under the assumption of universal domain) allows only for dictatorial or imposed aggregation. Our results build on and extend work of Bradley and Wagner [6] and yield as a corollary an impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation due to Dietrich [8] .
The Valuation Domain of an Allocation Problem.
In what follows, we denote by V the aforementioned valuation domain associated with a given allocation problem. We shall assume that any such domain satisfies the following minimal closure conditions: As noted earlier, aggregation theory has followed social choice theory in adopting an axiomatic approach to the study of AAMs. Here we wish to focus on the following axiomatic restriction on aggregation:
Remark. In specifying that the domain of any AAM must be equal to the set Under the assumption that the domain of any AAM is equal to ( , ; ),
A n m V condition I is clearly equivalent to the existence of functions : Remark 3.1.2. The prototype of Theorem 3.1 (and all related aggregation theorems involving weighted arithmetic averaging) is the characterization of weighted arithmetic means in Aczél and Wagner [2] , which involves, unsurprisingly, solving the Cauchy functional equation
Remark 3.1.3. When 1 s  and the entities under consideration constitute a set of possible states of the world, Theorem 3.1 characterizes the methods for aggregating the probability mass functions (see note 1, supra) of several individuals subject to condition I. Genest [10] has proved analogous results for the aggregation of probability measures defined on a fixed sigma algebra. There is a large literature on the aggregation of probabilistic judgments. Genest and Zidek [11] furnish a useful annotated bibliography of work done through the mid-1980s. Of particular note is the beautiful paper of McConway [13] , mentioned briefly in Section 1. [9] , in which it is demonstrated that, under certain axioms, including, in particular, independence, an aggregation rule for binary or cardinal judgments must be linear.
An Application to Judgment Aggregation
Following Dietrich [8] , call a set of well-formed formulas (wffs) X of the propositional calculus an agenda if X is closed under logical negation. enlarge the co-domain of the aggregation functions under consideration. In social welfare theory, for example, Black [5] has proved that Arrow's impossibility theorem no longer holds if voters' preferential orderings are "single peaked," and Brown [7] has shown that Arrow's axioms can be satisfied if the societal ordering produced by a social welfare function need only be acyclic. In the realm of probability aggregation, the limitation to aggregation by weighted arithmetic means (as in [12] and [13] ) can be evaded, while still satisfying state-wise aggregation , if one is willing to countenance certain lower or upper probabilities in the co-domain. 10 However, the aforementioned strategies do not appear to offer much in the way of consolation with respect to Theorem 3. This gambit may even be reasonable when the goal is to allocate a fixed sum of money among competing projects. But it appears especially inapt in the case of aggregating probability mass functions, and even more so in the case of judgment aggregation. 12 Another possible way of dodging Theorem 3.2 might be to aggregate the values assigned to each entity using weighted arithmetic averaging, and then round the resulting assignments so that they are elements of , V while still summing to . s But this would require one to select and defend a rounding policy, the difficulty of which has been amply illustrated in the problem of allocating seats in a legislature (see, e.g., [4] ).
It should be noted that the foregoing strategies all persist in satisfying some sort of independence condition. Would dropping independence open up the canon of acceptable aggregation methods? It is difficult to see how to avail oneself of the freedom from independence if one insists on maintaining the requirement of universal domain. 13 If one gives up both independence and universal domain, however, the outlook is, at least in certain cases, more promising. It is shown in [17] , for example, that (stochastic) independence-preserving probability aggregation methods can be constructed if such methods need only apply to probability profiles exhibiting a particular type of independence, and one dispenses with the requirement of state-wise aggregation. In a particularly interesting example from the theory of judgment aggregation, Dietrich [8] has exhibited an aggregation method that satisfies independence only for certain sets of logically independent "premises" and generates consistent collective judgment sets.
As things presently stand, however, these strategies do not seem to offer much help in dodging Theorem 3.2, for there appear to be no natural proper subsets of ( , ; ) A n m V on which one might exploit the freedom from entity-wise aggregation to devise an aggregation method with codomain ( ; ) .
A m V While this state of affairs persists, Theorem 3.2 would appear to have genuine limitative implications for the goal of devising a rational method of allocation aggregation for finite valuation domains.
APPENDIX A
In preparation for what follows, let us recall a few basic topological concepts. If x is any real number and 0, ( 1)( ) ( 1) 0 10. But see Wagner [15] , where merely requiring that an aggregation method for probability profiles produce a set function  satisfying (
for all events E and F entails aggregation by weighted arithmetic averaging (so that the output of aggregation is again a probability measure, and nothing is gained). 12. It is one thing to restrict individuals allocating a sum of money to different projects to assigning, say, multiples of $10,000 to each project, with the aim of arriving at a consensual allocation in which projects are allocated multiples of $100. But asking individuals to artificially limit their probability assignments to a particular valuation domain seems contrary to the goal of arriving at the most informed (or best calibrated) consensual probability assignments. In the case of aggregating zero-one judgments over a set of pairwise contradictory, exhaustive propositions, it is not even clear how one would interpret the weighted averages of such judgments that would be allowed by enlarging the codomain {0,1}. Formally, such averages would of course constitute a probability mass function on the set of propositions in question. But they would lack foundation, either as objective or as subjective probabilities.
13. As argued in [17] and [18] , it is difficult to imagine how one can devise an aggregation method that applies to every logically possible profile without proceeding entity-by-entity (resp., proposition-by-proposition or state-by-state).
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